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This thesis examines current decision and control theory
and U.S. Army doctrine to develop a systemic model of the
U.S. Army tactical command control process. The model is
investigated in a simulated brigade delay operation using
First Battle. The data obtained from the simulation is used
to demonstrate specific analytic tools which have potential
for application within the command control process. These
quantitative tools are proposed as a supplement to the
qualitative analysis performed by the force commander and
his staff during combat operations. Prospects for
employment of these techniques are enhanced by the current
development of automated components within the U.S. Army
tactical command control system and by training of personnel
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"The real measure of the Maneuver Control System (MCS)
is the synergistic effect of the system in enhancing the
field commander's ability to influence the battle. ..the
MCS compressed decision making time..." New weapon
systems "...increase geometrically the pace and intensity
of combat. Something more than acetate, grease pencils
and VRC-12 radios is needed to realize the full potential
of these systems employed in concert." [Ref. 1
]
This excerpt from a message sent by the Commander-in-
Chief, United States Army Europe to the Department of the
Army Staff, highlights user endorsement of automated support
in the U.S. Army tactical command control system. Current
manual procedures for transmission, processing and analysis
of battlefield information are slow and error prone. The
gain in combat potential achieved by weapon system
modernization in the U.S. Army may well be negated by an
ineffective manual tactical command control system.
The Maneuver Control System is one of many automated
systems which are being developed and deployed for use in
U.S. Army tactical units. For many years, the Air Ground
Operations System has been in use to manage air defense and
close air support assets. The automated systems in the U.S.
Army Field Artillery were developed to manage the fire
support technical subsystem. At a recent Corps Commanders'
Conference at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the VII Corps
Commander, LTG William J. Livsey explained his use of
8

microcomputers in the VII Corps Tactical Operations Center.
All of these examples demonstrate the climate in the U.S.
Army which exists to support a transition from manual to
automated systems for information communication, processing
and analysis.
The challenge which the U.S. Army faces is to achieve
this transition by designing and developing systems which
satisfy the tactical commander's requirements by appropriate
allocation of tasks to men and machines. This transition
may require changes to organizational structure, procedures,
and facilities. Personnel must be trained to operate and
maintain these systems effectively. U.S. Army Doctrine must
evolve to reflect the impact of these automated systems on
tactics and leadership.
Responsibility for management of automated tactical
command control systems in the U.S. Army appears to be in
the domain of the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity
(CACDA) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence Directorate (C"^I)
of CACDA is involved in the development of architecture to
integrate evolving automated systems into Force Level
Maneuver Control (SIGMA). The current architecture which
the CI Directorate has developed is referred to as the
Command Control Subordinate Systems Architecture (CCS^).
This architecture was developed around the manual and
automated systems which currently exist within the Air

Defense, Fire Support, Maneuver, Intelligence and Combat
Service Support subsystems of the tactical unit or force. A
product of this architecture which demonstrates the
complexity of the problem is an information exchange matrix
of some eighty items of information which are initiated or
developed by one or more of the above subsystems and which
are required by many or all of the other subsystems to
perform their mission. The architecture as developed
defines a redundant network of communications and
standardized information to achieve automated support for
command control within the maneuver force.
Assuming that the communication network is technically
feasible, the question becomes one of determining how best
to use the available information within the force command
control system. The system profile of Force Level Maneuver
Control (SIGMA) which describes the time schedule for
evolutionary development of the system identifies analytic
tools as the post January, 1983 phase. Prior to January,
1983, emphasis was sequentially placed on communications
interface, fixed format reports and graphics, reports
processing and establishment of a formal data base
management system. These phases have been accomplished for
the Maneuver Control System and a decision for limited
production has been made.
Initially, the thrust of this thesis effort was the
development of analytic tools and data manipulation
10

procedures to assist the force commander and his staff in
the execution of their command control responsibilities.
However, after detailed examination of the problem, it
became apparent that analytic tools must be developed in a
systems context to have meaning and utility. Useful
analytic tools and data manipulation procedures should aid
in battlefield perception, alternative analysis, decision
making and control during mission execution. Section II of
this thesis provides a brief discussion of the theory of
decision and control as it pertains to tactical command
control. The section also addresses man's limitations as an
information processor with obvious implications for system
design and the necessity of a system's approach. In Section
III, a systems approach is used to examine the U.S. Army
maneuver brigade. The components of the brigade are
identified and their relationships are clarified. The
concept of system integration is presented. Force
integration is achieved via the control exercised by the
brigade commander and his staff over the activities of all
assigned and attached elements in the brigade. Section IV
examines a model of the force command control process. The
brigade commander and his staff execute this process to
achieve force integration. They gather information, analyze
that information, identify problems, generate solutions,
direct action and control execution in this cyclical
process. Each step in the process is described.
11

Sections I-IV provide a framework for development of
specific analytic tools which may be applied within the
force command control process. Similar tools might be
developed for command control within each technical
subsystem. In this thesis the technical subsystems of the
force are the subordinate units of the force which exercise
intensive command and control of production and distribution
systems. In this context, the direct support field
artillery battalion and the combat engineer company are
technical subsystems of the supported brigade. Each
technical subsystem is controlled by a commander and a
formal or informal staff with responsibilities assigned
according to functional areas. Personnel services,
intelligence, operations and logistics are the functional
areas for staff organization which are most frequently
identified in company, battalion or brigade level units.
The process model described in Section IV was examined for
utility in a limited manual simulation using the First
Battle Combat Simulation. The simulation was also executed
to generate force data which would be obtained in actual
combat using Maneuver Control System report formats.
Section V provides a description of the simulation and
techniques applied within the force command control process
to execute a brigade delay. Data obtained from the
simulation is presented in Section VI to demonstrate
examples of analytic tools which might be employed in the
12

force command control process. Each technique is related to
a specific step in the command control process. Section VII
presents the results and conclusions of this thesis.
The United States Army maneuver brigade organic to the
mechanized or armored division is the focal point of this
analysis. The concepts and techniques developed may be
modified for application in other force command control
echelons. Major modifications are required to these
techniques for application in airborne, airmobile or light
infantry forces due to equipment transport limitations. The
brigade level was selected for simplicity of structure and




II. CURRENT COMMAND CONTROL THEORY
A. THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION OF LAND COMBAT
"Combat power is relative, never an absolute, and has
meaning only as it compares to that of the enemy. The
appropriate combination of maneuver, firepower and
protection by a skillful leader within a sound operational
plan will turn combat potential into actual combat power.
Superior combat power applied at the decisive place and
time decides the battle." [Ref. 2: p. 2-4]
The combat commander has the objective to maximize the
combat power of his force and to engage his force in combat
under advantageous conditions. The concept of combat
potential suggests that there is some maximum destructive
force which a combat unit can generate at any time on the
battlefield. Combat power is the proportion of combat
potential which is actually generated by the force as it
engages in combat. The amount of combat power actually
generated is dependent upon the skill of the leader.
"Leadership is the crucial element of combat power." [Ref.
2: p. 2-5] The combat leader is assigned a tactical mission
and resources to accomplish that mission. The leader
formulates an operational plan to combine the maneuver,
firepower and protection assets of his force to generate
peak combat power at the decisive place and time. The
commander achieves success by sound planning and aggressive
execution of the plan. Sound planning requires managerial
techniques for the solution of complex problems. Aggressive
14

execution requires dynamic leadership. The combat commander
trains throughout his career to develop these skills.
The October, 1982 Army Magazine documents the dynamic
modernization process which is occurring in the U.S. Army.
New weapon systems, organizations and doctrine are evolving
which increase the combat potential of our forces. New
weapon systems possess increased mobility, firepower and
protection. The constraint which may restrict the gain in
actual combat power generated by these new systems is the
ability of the commander to direct and control his forces
during combat.
"Military and civilian leaders on both sides of the
Atlantic have frequently touted the theme of force
multiplication through command and control." [Ref. 3: p.
1]
While command control may be a combat multiplier, the
preceding discussion suggests that a more relevant problem
is to provide a minimum level of command control within the
force to remove this constraint on the combat potential of
the force. The next subsection explores the nature of the
constraint created by the leader and a path which may remove
the constraint.
B. THE BINDING CONSTRAINT
The combat commander leads a complex system. He seeks
to maximize the combat power of his force and to engage his
force in combat under advantageous conditions. The tactical
command control system exists to assist the commander in the
15

execution of his leadership responsibilities on the AirLand
Battlefield. The leader as a human being has information
processing limitations.
"The mind is excellent at manipulating models that
associate words and ideas. But the unaided human mind,
when confronted with modern social and technological
systems, is not adequate for constructing and interpreting
dynamic models that represent changes through time in
complex s y s t e m s . . . Ou r mental models are ill
defined. ..as sumptions are not clearly ident if ied. ..The
mental model is not easy to communicate to others." [Ref.
4: pp. 3-2, 3-3 ]
In his book, D ecis io n Ma king U nder U ncer ta inty , Jerry
Felsen documents human information processing limitations:
"The relatively low capacity of the human sensory channels
limits his ability to perceive the current state of the
environment. His information storage is slow and
unreliable. His modest computing power permits him to
deal with only simple mental images of the real
world. ..The human mind performs well when dealing with
patterns which are well structured, but of low
dimension. ..abstract and unstructured patterns cannot be
efficiently handled by humans as soon as the dimension of
the pattern exceeds four. John R. Hayes, (1962) has found
that giving a decision maker more than four facts reduces
both the quality and speed of his decision. In
fact. ..confusion increases so rapidly that decision makers
will perform better if some of the relevant information is
eliminated. ..Decision makers who face these problems are
the first to admit that the basis of their decisions is
intuitive and qualitative, and could be improved if
appropriate quantitative aids were available..." [Ref. 5:
p. 5]
Felsen concludes from this analysis that computer oriented
approaches are necessary for effective decision analysis due
to the increasing complexity and size of systems and the
unacceptable conditions created by incorrect or suboptimal
16

decisions. [Ref. 5: p. 6] Soviet analysts have arrived at
similar conclusions:
"The volume of information at the disposal of the
commanders controlling modern combat is so large, and the
changes in this information are so rapid that it cannot be
processed, and a timely decision cannot be made. ..the
solution of the combat control problem under modern
conditions lies on the same path as the control of other
complex processes. ..on the automation paths." [Ref. 6:
pp. 309-310]
In an article entitled 'Command Technology', Colonel
J. Hemsley asserts that,
"...the significant point is that in so far as the land
battleis concerned, the Soviet armed forces have
recognized the demands that the tempo of contemporary
combat operations are going to make upon leadership,
command and control and the principles are embodied in
both doctrine and tactical teachi ng.. .Their justifiable
concern lies in the fact that technological advances in
weapon systems and associated equipments have increased
the mobility of operations past the point where human
capabilities in terms of assessment and command decisions
can match the potential improvement in military
performance." [Ref. 7: p. 63]
Colonel Hemsley's statement supports the concept that at a
minimum, ineffective command control decreases combat power
as a proportion of combat potential. A portion of the
combat power of the force has been wasted. While command
control may not be a combat multiplier, ineffective command
control can waste the combat power generated by lethal
weapon systems and trained soldiers.
The human limitations of the commander described above
combined with the complexity of the system which he manages
suggest that current manual procedures for information
processing, analysis, decisionmalcing and control guarantee
17

paralysis or at least reduced effectiveness at the critical
point in the battle. Automation within the tactical command
control process appears to be a viable solution to this
problem. The Maneuver Control System (MCS) is currently
being produced for selected deployment to units. The
Command Control Subordinate Systems (CCS^) architecture for
automation of command control information processing has
been developed to assist the tactical commander in the
performance of his leadership functions. The CCS
architecture creates a network for sharing of information
across the functional areas of maneuver, air defense, fire
support, intelligence, and combat service support. The
Mitre Corporation has completed a detailed analysis of each
subordinate system to determine information requirements and
procedures. The CCS architecture is evolutionary. The
analytic tools generated in this research effort are
products of the information base created by the CCS
architecture and reports developed by MCS.
C. A SYSTEMS APPROACH
To gain insight into the tactical unit, it is necessary
to examine its organization in terms of its functional
characteristics and the manner in which these functional
subsystems interact. These functional subsystems operate
together for a common purpose. [Ref. 4: p. 1-1] In a
military sense, the unit's purpose is twofold.
18

"...accomplishment of the assigned mission and the
preservation of the force.. .the tactics of a unit can be
viewed as making the most of one's resources." [Ref. 8:
p. 2]
The systems approach enables definition of the system to be
examined, the environment surrounding the system, the
system's resources, its outputs, and its control process.
[Ref. 9] The tactical unit, as a system, executes an
assigned mission and expends resources in the execution of
that mission. This process is dynamic. The state or
condition of a unit and its environment change over time.
"The essential aim of a system dynamics study is to find
policies which will control the firm effectively in the
face of the shocks which will fall upon it." [Ref. 10: p.
2]
As a system, the tactical unit,
"...receives inputs of energy, information, and materials
from the environment, transforms these, and returns
outputs to the environment. .. The managerial subsystem
spans the entire organization by setting goals, and
planning, organizing and controlling the necessary
activities." [Ref. 11: p. 47]
"...The essential problem for managers is that of
controlling the organization so as to take advantage of
favorable opportunities while defending it against
...upsets." [Ref. 10: p. i ]
In Section III, the maneuver brigade is examined as a
system consisting of functional subsystems of people,





In an analysis of complex organizations, Herbert Simon
identified three layers within the organization:
1. A layer of production and distribution.
2. A layer of programmed (automatic) decision processes
for routine operations.
3. A layer of non -programmed decision processes for
monitoring the first level processes, redesigning them
and changing parameter values [Ref. 12: pp. 49-50].
In a tactical unit, these layers correspond respectively to:
1. Combat, combat support, and combat service support
elements at levels from individual crew to company,
troop or battery.
2. Standing operating procedures and doctrine which
dictate routine actions.
3. The command control system with emphasis on
organizations above company level in which a formal
staff structure exists to support the commander.
Herbert Simon's frequently used model of intelligence
gathering, designing of alternatives and choice of a
particular course of action appears to adequately describe
the decision making process in tactical units. [Ref. 12:
pp. 1-4] The control process is,
"...that function of the system which provides adjustments
in conformance to the plan; the maintenance of variations
from system objectives within allowable limits. ..Control
is maintained through a network of information flow..."
[Ref. 11: p. 74
]
Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig suggest that measures of
effectiveness of the command control system include:
stability--ability of the system to maintain a predictable
pattern over time, sens itivity- -the variation from norms
20

which occurs before an adjusting response is invoked, and
responsiveness--the speed with which the system can correct
variations from norms or stated objectives. [Ref. 1 1 : p.
47] If these measures are applied to an effective command
control system then that system should reflect stability,
sensitivity and responsiveness resulting in mission
accomplishment and efficient resource utilization regardless
of enemy actions. Theorists are in general agreement that
decision processes are dependent upon the flow and
processing of information. In a military context, the
decision process can be modeled as a two stage activity
involving the formulation of an initial plan for an assigned
mission and subsequent adjustment of that plan until a new
mission is received. This model is described in Section IV.
In the process of making decisions and exercising
control over production systems, the commander and his staff
must have some common framework to insure unity of effort.
This is commonly referred to as a decision strategy. This
is not a game theoretical approach. Initially, the number of
alternatives is too large, the uncertainty is high and the
variables initially are too numerous to allow gaming
techniques. Moreover, game approaches do not appear
tractable in the dynamic environment of combat. In such an
environment, attempts to arrive at an immediate optimal
solution may be disastrous. Jerry Felsen describes an
iterative process of decision making and control which seeks
21

to move to the optimal solution in a finite number of steps.
The initial decision must be at least within the feasible
solution space even if it is not the optimal solution.
[Ref. 5] In this context, the commander and his staff seek
information in a purposeful manner to reduce uncertainty.
Additional information is expensive in terms of time,
resources expended and opportunities lost. Quality
decisions require establishment of a cause and effect
relationship. Stability created by effective command
control enables learning to occur at all levels. Correct
cause and effect relationships are determined. In examining
alternatives and reducing to feasible, desirable
alternatives
,
"...options which are both more risky and less profitable
are of no interest. ..the interesting cases are ones where
you only get more profit at the expense of more risk and
where you can reduce the risk at a cost." [Ref. 13: pp.
41
-42]
"The problem for the controller is to develop a collection
of policies which will always produce satisfactory
dynamics in the face of any action by the complement.
Such a set. of policies is said to be robust .. .Robust
policies make the most of opportunities and the best of
catastrophes." [Ref. 10: p. 28]
In the context of tactical command control, the
complement is the enemy, weather, terrain and intangibles
such as fear, fatigue and stress. Quality information not
only in terms of the current situation, but also in terms
of how the combat situation is changing over time is a
principal tool which the commander and his staff must use to
22

reduce uncertainty and risk. [Ref. 11: p. 8] This concept
of information which displays trends over time is a key
concept of this study. In terms of system dynamics [Ref.
4], a system is described in terms of its state variables at
any time. This is the system's condition. Rates indicate
the manner in which the state variables are changing over
time. The rate variables determine the change per unit time
of the level variables. Forrester states that,
"...the model of a system must contain one level for each
quantity needed to describe the condition of the actual
system." [Ref. 4: p. 4-11 ]
Levels of a combat unit include personnel, weapon systems,
fuel, ammunition, time and location.
Control theory suggests that discrepancies between the
current state and a desired state can be determined and
corrected if the magnitude of the discrepancy is excessive.
[Ref. 14] This comparison process is difficult and time
consuming in a manual mode but may be reported by exception
in an automated system. The commander and his staff must
define the desired state in terms of the tactical mission
and establish acceptable thresholds for variation. Status
reports may be automatically examined to perform the
comparison. In situations which defy forecasting, it may be
more appropriate to,
"...devise a control system which would not depend on
forecasts but which would respond to current events in a
smooth and efficient manner." [Ref. 10: p. 19]
23

The control cycle is an iterative process of monitoring
of system outputs, comparison of actual results with desired
results and appropriate adjustments to procedures and
resource allocation to accomplish the assigned mission.
[Ref . 14 ]
"Command and control is the process through which the
activities of military forces are directed, coordinated
and controlled to accomplish the mission. The process
encompasses the personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities and procedures necessary to gather and analyze
information, to plan for what is to be done, to issue
instructions, and to supervise the execution of
operations." [Ref. 15: p. 1-1]
The above statement is a succinct description of the
tactical command control system. Efforts to improve the
performance of the command control system must seek to
accommodate human limitations and aid in the reduction of
biases and inconsistencies. The leader's ability to make
valid decisions may be improved by training as well as by
establishment of standardized streamlined procedures for
information analysis, planning, plan dissemination and
supervision of plan execution. The commander is faced with
a dynamic problem. His goal is to accomplish an assigned
tactical mission at minimal cost. This goal is confounded
by an enemy which seeks to make mission success expensive or
impossible. Weather, terrain, and time present additional
dimensions of complexity to the commander in his active
search for the optimal policy. The commander must rapidly
reduce the alternative policies to a single policy which is
24

simple, feasible and flexible. This search for optimality
is a creative process which can be enhanced by systematic
procedures and techniques of logic. The recently developed
syllabus for the Combined Arms and Service Staff School
(CAS ) includes instruction in quantitative skills, military
decisionmaking and other command and staff skills. Such
training should improve the skills of staff officers and
commanders to execute their duties effectively.
25

III. THE MANEUVER BRIGADE AS A COMBAT SYSTEM
A . GENERAL
In this section, the maneuver brigade is examined as a
combat system. Herbert Simon's paradigm of the layers of an
organization is used to identify the production and
distribution components of the brigade, the layer of
programmed decisions and the layer of unprogrammed
decisions. [Ref. 12] A concept of system integration is
developed to describe the manner in which these layers are
combined into a combat force. This integration is achieved
by the force command and control system.
B. TECHNICAL SUBSYSTEMS
In terms of Herbert Simon's paradigm of the layers
within an organization, the maneuver brigade can be examined
as a system. At the production and distribution layer,
units are organized to perform specialized functions.
Specialilzed units which are normally found within a
maneuver brigade include maneuver, fire support, air
defense, engineer, intelligence, signal, medical,
maintenance and supply. Other units sometimes included are
aviation, transportation, military police and chemical.
Each of these units constitutes a technical subsystem with
an identifiable internal technical command control system.
26

Each unit has a commander and formal or informal staff
organized to execute detailed management and leadership of
the technical subsystem. [Ref. 15; p. 2-1 ] The maneuver
command control system performs a dual function. It
intensively manages the assigned maneuver forces and
coordinates and directs the activities of the other
technical subsystems to support the maneuver force in the
execution of the tactical mission. The unifying document
for the execution of a coordinated effort by all subsystems
in concert is the brigade operations order. Each subsystem
commander leads his unit and directs actions consistent with
the brigade commander's concept and the resource constraints,
imposed. The brigade commander and his staff are referred
to as the force command control element. The brigade staff
is the focal point for force information and coordination.
The number, thirteen or more, and complexity of these
technical subsystems frustrate efforts by the brigade
commander and his staff to exercise intensive management of
every subsystem. The alternative is to decentralize control
and to intensively manage only the areas which are most
critical; those which clearly endanger or guarantee mission
success. In this light, the brigade commander and his staff
formulate ground tactical plans and coordinate support of
those plans with the command control elements of the other
technical subsystems. Within this relational framework,
procedures and techniques must be developed to streamline
27

the command control process to achieve the goals of AirLand
Battle Doctrine. Section VI addresses specific tools which
may contribute to this goal.
Simon's layer of programmed decisions within each
technical subsystem consists of formal and informal standing
operating procedures and policies which dictate action in
routine or pre-planned situations. Such procedures include
standard reporting policies, communication frequency
assignments, vehicle loading diagrams, emergency signals and
numerous other procedures peculiar to a specific technical
subsystem or to the force as a whole. These policies will
change with a change in the operating environment and the
tactical mission assigned to the force. In the light of
such complex dependencies, few situations can be labeled as
routine. For each technical subsystem and for the force,
policies must be formulated which minimize the impact of
such dependencies and which contribute to maximizing combat
power. In terms of rapid reorganization and reconstitution
on the AirLand Battlefield, standardization across forces of
similar types is essential as well.
Simon's layer of unprogrammed decisions within the
maneuver brigade is provided by the brigade commander and
his staff. Each unprogrammed, non-routine decision requires
coordination, analysis, a decision, communication of the
decision and supervision of execution. Such a process
consumes critical resources to include time. Delays may
28

create confusion and wasted combat power. All situations
cannot be anticipated but sound planning and coordination
within the force may minimize the occurrence of situations
requiring unprogrammed decisions or management by exception.
Sound planning will free the brigade commander and his staff
to concentrate their efforts on the critical aspects and
decisions which contribute directly to mission success.
C. SYSTEM INTEGRATION
1 . Vertical Integration
Each technical subsystem consumes resources as it
executes assigned missions. It generates technical detailed
information about its condition or state and communicates
that information within functional or technical channels.
This information is aggregated as it moves through the
production, operational and planning levels of the
organization. The aggregated information provides the
subsystem commander and his staff with a comparison
capability to establish priorities and adjust policies in a
dynamic environment. Unit personnel, situation,
intelligence and logistic reports generate this technical
data base. The technical data may be manipulated to create
more general staff information which describes the condition
of a unit at a specific level of personnel or weapon system
strength. The Maneuver Control Data Base Management System
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seeks to standardize this technical data base. [Ref. 16:
pp. 444-446]
2 . Horizontal Integration
In terms of force control and coordination,
information must be shared across functional areas and
technical subsystems. The Command Control Subordinate
Systems (CCS ) architecture imposes requirements to achieve
this goal. In many cases, a single technical subsystem
supports all or many other technical subsystems. The
brigade ammunition supply point, for example, services all
units and requires information about unit basic loads and
on-hand quantities to manage resupply policies. The brigade
commander and his staff require information about fire
support and air defense assets which may impact on mission
success. Information generated by the intelligence
subsystem is required by the fire support subsystem to




At all levels of the system from technical to
strategic levels of command control, tracking and analysis
of the change in subsystem levels over time enables
evaluation of performance and prediction of the future
conditions of the system. Graphical display and comparison
of trends in similar units may suggest revised policies for
resource allocation to maintain units at acceptable levels
of personnel, weapon systems, maintenance and supply.
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Trends developed by the intelligence subsystem may create an
identifiable pattern of enemy activity which reduces the
commander's uncertainty of the enemy course of action.
Specific examples of trend maps are described in Section VI.
4 . Force Integration
The description of the maneuver brigade as a system
must include an understanding of the external environment.
The brigade is a subsystem of the division. The brigade
command control system coordinates with adjacent maneuver
units and with the division command control system.
Tactical missions and resources are assigned to the
maneuver brigade by the division. Designation of the main
effort by the division operations plan dictates the
relationship between adjacent brigades. Technical
information concerning the enemy, weather and terrain are
provided to the brigade by divisional assets. The maneuver




IV. THE BRIGADE TACTICAL COMMAND CONTROL PROCESS
A. GENERAL
The brigade tactical command control system consists of
personnel, facilities and procedures to analyze information,
plan operations, direct action and to supervise execution of
directives. [Ref. 15: p. 1-1] More generally, this system
is referred to as force command control. This system
integrates the activities of the technical subsystems within
the force to accomplish the assigned tactical mission. The
personnel who perform this function are the maneuver unit
commander and his coordinating and special staff. The
facilities which they use include map displays, information
centers, and communication equipment. The procedures which
they employ to accomplish their tasks are imbedded in the
tactical command control process. This process is designed
to purposefully analyze information to determine what is
currently being done, to compare the current situation with
the mission-defined desired situation and to develop and
direct corrective action as necessary.
Frequently, the critical constraint imposed on the
command control system is the time available to analyze
information, select a course of action and communicate that
course of action to units for execution. The effectiveness
of the tactical command control system is improved by
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training of personnel, standardizing and streamlining the
process and designing efficient facilities for information
processing and analysis. The focal point of system
improvements must be the procedures which are performed.
Some procedures may be executed automatically using
computers. Others require a creative process which is a
more appropriate endeavor of the commander and his staff.
This section elaborates a detailed model of the tactical
command control process. The process appears to have two
distinct phases: Formulation of the initial plan and
execution of the control cycle. A schematic diagram of the
initial planning phase is shown as Figure 1. Figure 2
depicts the control cycle.
B. INITIAL PLANNING SEQUENCE
This phase of the tactical command control process is a
formal, detailed sequence which normally begins with the
assignment of a new tactical mission or a substantial change
in the requirements of the current mission. The time
constraint may require modification or abbreviation of this
sequence. Adherence to this general process should result
in selection and execution of a feasible course of action in
a timely manner. Examination of each step in the sequence
provides an opportunity for appropriate allocation of tasks
to personnel and computers as well as specific methods to
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Figure 2. Control Cycle Process Model
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displays, information processing algorithms, standard
message formats and procedures for analysis of alternatives.
These specific methods are discussed in Section VI.
The process model presented in Figure 1 presents sixteen
sequential steps in the initial planning phase. Initially,
the commander and his principal staff officers have implicit
conceptual alternatives in mind to accomplish the newly
assigned mission. These conceptual alternatives are based
upon doctrinal education, professional experience, recent
information from personal observation of the force and
environment and subjective evaluation of the capabilities of
the force. The first three steps in the initial planning
phase constitute a formal information gathering stage. The
commander seeks to more clearly define the new mission and
the condition of forces on the battlefield. The next four
steps identify constraints which eliminate many potential
alternatives before they are considered in detail. These
alternatives are usually eliminated because of obvious
shortcomings which suggest infeasibil ity. The next two
steps involve the elaboration of remaining desirable
alternatives. These alternatives are subjected to detailed
analysis within the time constraint according to routine
procedures. Finally, the commander selects the preferred
alternative or course of action. The commander and the




1 . Tactical Mission Assigned
The tactical mission assignment provides information
to the commander and his staff concerning an assigned
objective and resources allocated to accomplish the mission.
Roland Tiede and Lewis Leake stated that,
"...Examination of combat mission statements disclosed
that these were statements in three dimensions: The
resources that could be expended, the time in which the
mission was to be performed, and the area- to be controlled.
These constraints provide precise criteria for determining
whether the mission was successfully achieved." [Ref. 17:
p. 595 ]
Ideally, the commander seeks to accomplish the mission at
minimal cost. A search for the best feasible alternative
course of action begins at this point. In most cases, the
uncertainty of the situation and the forces available
suggest an unmanageable number of alternatives. The
commander and his staff seek to reduce the alternatives
rapidly by purposeful analysis of information. This
information is contained in the force information base.
2 . Force Information Base
The force information base is generated by reports
and summaries transmitted from subordinate, higher, and
adjacent units and by direct observation of the battlefield
by the force commander. A recent briefing presented by
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command classifies
this information as technical, staff or command. [Ref. 18]
Manual and automated techniques are employed to convert
predominantly technical information into staff and command
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information. The transformed information creates a
perception of the battlefield. Standardized, automated
reporting procedures within the force may reduce errors and
inaccuracy within this information base.
3 . Define Current State
The technical data base is manipulated to develop a
snapshot of the battlefield. The goal is to achieve an
accurate perception of the battlefield. Frequently, the
commander's personal observations enhance the staff's
perception of the combat environment. The current state is
divided into friendly force size, activity and location,
enemy force size, activity and location, and environment to
include terrain and weather. The time constraint drives the
rapid and accurate development of this perception. A
directed search for additional information is expensive.
Further, only relevant information should be presented. A
technique developed from the theory presented in Sections II
and III is to concentrate on maneuver unit assets, locations
and activities and identification only of those relevant
aspects of other technical subsystems which constrain or
restrict maneuver options.
4. Current State Defined
The above process results in a common perception of
the battlefield by the force commander and his staff. The
quantifiable aspects of the units in the force have been
integrated with the commander's subjective evaluation of
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leadership, training and morale to determine unit
capabilities and limitations. A general understanding of
the level of uncertainty of enemy capabilities and intent
has been achieved. Effects of weather and terrain on
implicit alternatives have been developed.
5
.
Specify Criteria for Mission Success
The commander explicitly states the conditions which
define mission success. Criteria include force strength at
the point of mission completion, location and time.
Guidance concerning priorities and tradeoffs is provided.
The comparison of mission criteria or desired state to
current state allows the formulation of acceptable trends
over time. Further, thresholds are established for
discrepancies between current and desired states which
require command correction.
6 Desired State Defined
The criteria for mission success have been defined
and a comparison may be performed to determine specific
actions which are required to begin execution of the new
mission. An additional benefit of this formalized process
is a common perception of the battlefield. The commander
provides guidance to insure unity of effort.
"When explicit strategies are agreed (upon) during a
planning cycle, there is a better chance that middle
management's ad hoc decisions will be consistent with
them." [Ref. 13: p. 1 42 ]
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Potential conflicts which frequently result due to diverse
perceptions of the new mission and current situation within
the staff are reduced or eliminated. A common basis for
evaluation of alternatives has been established.
7 . Compare Function
The current and desired state are compared to
determine the magnitude and direction of actions necessary
to adjust to the new or changed mission. In M anag ement
Syst em Dyna mics, R.G. Coyle defines a discrepancy as the
difference between current and desired levels of a system at
a specific time. Levels of the force include location, task
organization, weapon system strength, personnel strength,
fuel, ammunition, leadership, morale and training. Coyle
suggests that the magnitude of the discrepancy be examined
to determine the force and magnitude of the corrective
action necessary. [Ref. 10: p. 9] Major discrepancies
require non-routine policy adjustments to include a change
in task organization, operational concept, unit locations or
control measures. The current plan being executed cannot be
adjusted or adapted to new requirements or conditions.
Minor adjustments are those changes which may be executed
within the current operational plan. Minor adjustments are
executed within the control cycle. Major adjustments
requiring revision of the current plan or generation of a




8 . Analyze Time Available
An analysis of mission, current and desired states
in the time and location dimensions is executed. Total time
available to transition from current activities to new
mission activities is determined. This total time is
divided into an initial planning phase, a reorganization
phase, a movement phase and a consolidation phase. The
initial planning phase is completed upon dissemination of a
warning order which includes the new mission task
organization, mission, operational concept, movement plan
and security plan. The reorganization phase is concluded as
maneuver and key support units initiate movement to
designated initial fighting or attack positions. During the
reorganization phase, subordinate units begin planning,
briefing, rehearsals, replenishment and reorganization
consistent with the warning order. The movement phase is
completed as maneuver and key support units close on initial
fighting and attack positions. Security is provided by
reconnaissance, air defense and aviation elements. Mobility
may be enhanced by appropriate allocation of engineer units.
The consolidation phase is completed as the attack, movement
to contact, delay or defense is initiated. This is the
point at which execution of the new mission begins. During
the consolidation phase, final plans are issued, briefings
and rehearsals are conducted, positions are improved,
supporting unit activities and adjacent unit plans are
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coordinated. The generated timeline quantifies the time
constraint imposed on the commander and staff to execute the
initial planning sequence.
9. Analyze Weather and Terrain
Air Land Battle Doctrine prescribes time horizons
for each echelon of the force. [Ref. 2: p. 7-15]
Consistent with this time horizon, the commander and his
staff analyze the effects of weather and terrain on the
range of alternatives for both friendly and enemy forces.
1 . Analyze Enemy Capabilities
Based on terrain and recent enemy activity, a
projection is made of anticipated enemy activity consistent
with the force's time horizon. The time horizon and terrain
constraint enable bounding of the problem to a finite set of
alternatives. A detailed understanding of enemy tactics





The commander and staff execute a detailed
examination of available maneuver forces and map these
forces to terrain and enemy. An iterative process of
maneuver allocation to the security mission, the main
effort, supporting efforts, reserve and rear area protection
clarifies the dimension of the mission and the potentially
feasible alternatives. Special staff members representing
technical subsystem commanders may observe this process.
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The constraint of available maneuver forces is developed in
detail.
1 2 . Generate Alternative Courses of Action
The preceding analysis has enabled the commander and
his staff to bound the problem and to identify possible
solutions. Specific alternative maneuver schemes are
developed which describe the phasing of each alternative,
tentative task organization and timeline. In a sense, a
dynamic programming problem has been analyzed. The binding
constraints which bound the problem have been identified.
The feasible region has been approximated. Again, special
staff officers may monitor the process.
1 3 . Analysis of Alternatives
The coordinating and special staff members analyze
each alternative course of action with respect to their
specific technical subsystem. Evaluation criteria include
feasibility in the dimensions of time and subsystem
resources available to support maneuver execution of each
alternative. Infeasible alternatives are identified. Such
alternatives cannot even be marginally supported by
technical subsystems with available resources. Preference
for feasible alternatives may be expressed if such
information is requested by the force commander. Subsystems
identified as critical to mission success receive the most
thorough attention. This feasibility analysis explicitly
recognizes the necessity of a systems approach to the
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solution of the force command control problem. The approach
suggested reduces the hazards of simplifying assumptions
which may yield an infeasible solution. It recognizes Jay
W. Forrester's belief that,
"...Because we cannot mentally manage all the facets of a
complex system at one time, we tend to break the system
into pieces and draw conclusions separately from the
subsystems. Such fragmentation fails to show how the
subsystems interact." [Ref. 4: p. 3-3]
1 4 . Commanders Decision and Detailed Guidance
The commander examines the feasible alternatives and
employs his own criteria of risk, payoff, flexibility and
initiative to select the preferred alternative to be
executed. He provides clarifying guidance in the form of a
specific scheme of maneuver and priority of support. He
emphasizes those aspects of the operation which he considers
critical to mission success. A loop may be invoked to





Formulate Task Organization, M ovement and Security
Plan
The coordinating and special staff develop a task
organization consistent with the commander's concept.
Movement and security plans are generated based upon the
task organization, time schedule and scheme of maneuver. An
operations overlay with boundaries and control measures is
also produced. The commander approves this plan and the
warning order is issued. Advance notice may have been
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provided to subordinate units, however this order enables
reorganization, detailed planning and execution by
subordinate units.
1 6 . Formulate Maneuver , Support and Contingency Plans
Concurrent to subordinate unit planning and
execution of the warning order, the coordinating and special
staff formalize the maneuver, support and contingency plans.
Technical subsystem commanders establish priorities and
allocate resources to support the scheme of maneuver.
Planning includes coordination with adjacent and higher
units and monitoring of enemy activity and subordinate unit
progress. The commander and selected members of his staff
may move to a new location to execute effective command
control during mission execution. The product of this step
is the formal operations order with support plans detailing
the execution of the assigned mission. The operations order
is issued to subordinate commanders for execution.
The above sixteen steps are a sequential process which
is performed by the brigade commander and his staff to
formulate a sound operational plan. The initial planning
phase is a specific process which reduces uncertainty and
sets goals for the brigade within the constraints of
available resources. The analysis of alternatives by all
technical subsystems recognizes the interdependence of
overall system performance on all components operating in
concert. Within the control cycle, the explicit strategies
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which have been developed can be examined for consistency in
terms of friendly performance and enemy courses of action.
C. CONTROL CYCLE EXECUTION
Within the control cycle, battlefield information is
analyzed to identify unacceptable conditions or trends which
require corrective action. Trends in enemy activity and
environmental conditions are monitored as well as the
progress of friendly forces executing assigned missions.
Coordination with adjacent units may generate requirements




The operational plan for execution of the mission is
translated into a time schedule for each unit which
projects the location and activity of the unit with respect
to time. Predictions are made of critical unit levels to
include weapon system strength, personnel strength,
ammunition and fuel. This enables future comparison of unit
situation or status reports to expectations. Each
coordinating and special staff officer performs this task
for his functional or technical subsystem. Critical levels





Higher, lower and adjacent units continue to submit
routine and exception reports which constitute the force's
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technical information base. Periodic reporting is a routine
procedure in United States Army tactical units. The time
interval between these reports is important as its duration
affects the sensitivity and responsiveness of the control
system. In Designin g O rganizations , Daniel Robey states,
"...The longer the time span between measures, the greater
the risk that the process will go out of control." [Ref.
19: p. 381 ] This assertion appears to be consistent with
system dynamics theory and studies performed by Coyle and
Forrester. The Maneuver Control System and other tactical
automated systems make more frequent reporting technically
feasible. In a maneuver brigade, company level units might
be required to provide information updates every thirty
minutes as well as immediate updates in critical situations
of intense combat. In the recent past, the shortest
reporting cycle using manual procedures was in the one hour
range. Longer reporting cycles and manual processing
procedures cause lags or delays in the control cycle which
may reduce the effectiveness of the control system. Robey
emphasizes that frequent reporting is more critical as the
uncertainty of the situation increases. [Ref. 19: p. 399]
3 . Update Current State
The technical information is transformed and
aggregated to create a perception of the current friendly,
enemy and environmental situation. Quantifiable levels of
the force to include location, personnel strength, weapon
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system strength, fuel, ammunition and current activity are
generated.. Intelligence summaries as well as unit reports
clarify current and projected enemy activity as well as
environmental conditions. Special staff officers update
coordinating staff officers on the condition and progress of
supporting units as they impact on execution of the combat
mission. Information contained in the technical data base
is accessed by technical subsystems command and control
elements to assist them in the execution of their support
functions
.
4. Update Desired State
Revisions may be required to the desired state due
to adjustments in the time schedule or task organization.
The force may be exceeding its expectations and executing
initiatives within the existing plan. The defined desired
state must be consistent with the commander's goals and the
realities of the tactical situation.
5. Compare Current and Desired States
The current levels of the force are compared with
the projected trends to identify unacceptable or exceptional
conditions. This examination includes an analysis of enemy
activity with projections formulated in the initial planning
sequence. The magnitude and direction of discrepancies are
identified. The dimensions of the comparison include time,
location, activity, personnel and weapon system strength.
The nature of the discrepancies may be acceptable suggesting
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no change to current plans. Unacceptable discrepancies
require staff and leadership action to correct the situation




A projection of the discrepancy in the time
dimension will indicate the time available to remedy the
condition or seize the initiative. The commander first
seeks to correct the condition internally with his current
resources. The time analysis restricts the available
alternatives and clarifies the feasible region. In many
cases, the commander and his staff perform a tradeoff
analysis to move conditions back into the acceptable range.
The time available is that period in which the discrepancy
can be corrected with current resources without major
revision of the current plan. Standard preplanned responses
are contained in contingency plans for reaction forces or
counterattacks and may be invoked in this cycle.
7 . Generate Alternatives
A creative process is executed similar to steps 11
and 12 in the initial planning sequence. Available
resources are examined in the context of enemy and friendly
situation as well as time available. Alternative courses of
action to include reallocation of fire support,
reinforcement, adjustment of boundaries, change in tactics
or adjustment of expectations are generated.
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8 . Analyze Alternatives
Each alternative is examined in time, cost, risk and
expected result dimensions. The alternatives must be
consistent and contribute to execution of the force mission.
Appropriate coordinating and special staff officers
participate in this analysis and evaluation process. A
feasibility estimate and rank ordering of alternatives
results
.
9 . Commander ' s Decision and Guidance
The results of analysis are evaluated by the
commander. Authority for implementation of minor
adjustments may be delegated to coordinating staff officers.
The commander selects the desired course of action or
alternative and provides specific guidance to the staff for
execution. Critical tasks are identified.
1 . Formulate Fragmentary Order
The framework of the operations order is used to
describe the adjustment or corrective action to be executed.
It details the units involved and the plan for execution of
the commander's decision. Annexes might include a new task
organization, fire support allocation, or a revised
operations overlay.
1 1 . Higher , Lower, Adjacent Units Informed
The fragmentary order is transmitted to appropriate
units. Units begin execution of the revised plan and report
progress to the force commander's staff. Clarifying
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instructions are issued as necessary. The control cycle




This section has presented a general model of the
command control process performed in United States Army
tactical units. The model has evolved from examination of
doctrinal materials from the United States Army Command and
General Staff College, concurrent efforts by the analytic
community at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, (CACDA, CAORA, AMMO),
and limited personal experience of the authors. In its
present form it is a general model of the process. The
process is adapted to specific missions, environments and
operational types by individual users. This modeling
process can aid effective decision making by increasing
"...general understanding of the system..." and aiding
"...in the development of alternative plans or courses of
action to be considered..." as well as improved description
of system requirements, constraints and interactions. [Ref.
20: p. 3 45] Force command control is a complex process.
Jay W. Forrester asserts that,
"...Model validity is a relative matter. The use of a
...model should be judged in comparison with the mental
image or other abstract model which would be used
instead." [Ref. 4: p. 3-4]
In the process of transition from a manual to an automated
system, such a model is essential to define system
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requirements in terms of tasks performed by machines and
those performed by men. The general models contained in
doctrinal publications lack the specificity necessary to
design an effective man-machine system. The next two
chapters will show that this model provides detail adequate
for identification of specific procedures within the process





An early version of the process model described in
Section III was exercised in a simulated brigade delay at
the Battle Simulation Center, Fort Ord, California. This
simulation was executed to examine and refine the process
model, to develop potential analytic tools and to obtain
sample data representative of the type of data which might
be generated in actual combat. This data was subsequently
examined for development of descriptive and predictive
analytic tools which are presented in Section VI.
The First Battle Combat Simulation was selected as the
vehicle for detailed analysis. First Battle provided a
level of resolution to maneuver company level for U.S.
forces which appeared to be adequate for requirements while
meeting resource constraints of time and available player
personnel. Pegasus, Dunn Kempf, and CAMMS exceeded
resolution requirements and resource constraints unless
major modifications were applied to normal rules and
procedures. The simulation was executed during the month of
August, 1983 by the authors with support from 1 LT Geoffrey
T. Megargee, the of f icer-in-charge of the Battle Simulation
Center, MSG Stanley D. Kluth and SP4 Paul Salinas, both of
the OPFOR element, HHC, 107th MI Battalion. The authors
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planned and executed the brigade delay. The opposing forces
were controlled by the soldiers cited above, employing
tactics described in FM 100-2-1, Soviet Arm y Operations And
Tactic s. This section provides a detailed description of
the simulation as well as methodologies employed in the
process model.
B. SCENARIO
The standard scenario developed by the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College for the defensive tactics
subcourse was employed with minor modifications. This
scenario develops a U. S. Corps defense in the Fulda-Erfurt
sector of the Federal Republic of Germany. The 10th (U.S.)
Corps is opposed by the 24th Combined Arms Army (CAA) which
is expected to attack with four motorized rifle divisions
and two tank divisions. The 2nd Brigade, 23rd Armored
Division is assigned the mission to delay east of the Fulda
River for a period of six hours (H hour to H+6 hours) and to
then defend in sector west of the Fulda River to defeat
elements of two motorized rifle divisions. This mission is
a modification of the standard scenario. This modification
essentially requires the brigade to conduct a covering force
operation and subsequent defense in sector to defeat
elements of two motorized rifle divisions. A schematic of
the brigade sector is shown as Figure 3. Phase lines and








Figure 3 . Brigade Sector Schematic
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frequently in this analysis. It is suggested that the
reader examine and conceptualize the dimensions before
proceeding.
The brigade is designated as the main effort as a result
of threat analysis by the division staff and the division
commander's operational concept. This designation implies
that adjacent units will coordinate and adjust their plans
and execution consistent with the main effort. During the
simulation, adjacent forces were fought by Captain Edward
Negrelli, a fellow student at the Naval Postgraduate School.
C. ASSUMPTIONS
Some simplifying assumptions were made in the
formulation and execution of the simulation. A brief
statement of key assumptions follows:
Current operations have been restricted to conventional
fire and maneuver.
Neither side has employed nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons but both sides are capable of
employing such weapons. A maximum of thirty minutes
advance warning of such weapon employment by enemy
forces may be provided.
The brigade is task organized with Division '86 maneuver
forces consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions
and two Ml tank battalions. Two field artillery
battalions, an air defense battery, an engineer company,
and a military intelligence detachment provide combat
support. The combat service support package includes a
maintenance company, a supply section, and a medical
company. Other support allocations are standard to
include signal, aviation and Air Force Liaison.
The brigade is currently located in an assembly area




The brigade has eight hours to occupy initial delay-
positions .
The mission has not been preplanned. However, unit
leaders are familiar with the terrain in the operational
area.
Units are at full strength with adequate training,
leadership and good morale.
Final administrative and logistic actions to prepare
for combat will be completed in two hours. Such actions
include final fueling, ammunition distribution, ration
issue, and emergency maintenance of critical weapon
systems
.
Local air parity exists. Risk, of enemy air attack is
moderate
.
No significant enemy forces have crossed the
international boundary. The enemy has the capability to
insert a light infantry battalion in the brigade sector.
Divisional cavalry assets will constitute a rear area
reaction force.
D. MISSION
The brigade has been assigned an initial mission to
delay for a specified period of time and a subsequent
mission to defend in sector. Such a mission definition
provides the brigade commander with limited criteria for
determining the minimum levels of force effectiveness which
he must achieve to accomplish the initial and subsequent
mission. The delay mission is executed to gain time to
reduce uncertainty about the enemy course of action, to
avoid decisive combat under unfavorable conditions of
terrain and force dispositions, to draw the enemy into an
unfavorable position and to inflict damage on the advance
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elements of the attacking force. The delaying force's
actions also may deny the attacker knowledge about the
location of the main defensive effort. [Ref. 2: pp. 12-1 -
12-8] Essentially, the brigade is charged with the
responsibility to execute a covering force operation in its
assigned defensive sector.
E. ENTITIES AND ATTRIBUTES
The manual simulation for the brigade delay explicitly
modeled the maneuver and fire support assets of the brigade.
Company and battery level units were positioned and
controlled on the game board. Levels of the units which
were recorded during the course of the simulation included
time, location with respect to the international boundary,
weapon system strength, combat activity and a subjective net
assessment. The time clock started with movement of enemy
units across the international boundary. Weapon system
strength tracked the number of tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles and howitzers in each company or battery. Combat
activity descriptors were none, light, moderate or heavy.
Net assessment was a subjective percentage evaluation of
current unit combat capability. These elements of
information were developed from the format of the
Commander's Report contained in the Maneuver Control System
User's Guide. [Ref. 21] This technical information was
recorded at the completion of each thirty minute game turn
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to simulate the command reporting system. The communication
process was not explicitly modeled.
F. SIMULATION OF THE DELAY
The delay was executed under the rules of First Battle.
Game turns followed a general sequence of preplanned
indirect fire by red, counterfire by blue, red initial
movement, direct fire by blue, hasty attack by red (close
combat), acceptance or refusal of close combat by blue,
resolution of close combat, and final movement by both
sides. Each game turn simulated thirty minutes of combat
operations. The simulation stopped after five hours and
thirty minutes of play with blue forces defending on the
western bank of the Fulda River. A practice delay was
executed to familiarize players with rules and procedures.
G. INITIAL PLAN FORMULATION
1 . General
The process model described in Section IV was
employed to formulate the initial plan and to execute the
control cycle for the delay portion of the brigade mission.
The examination was restricted to the commander's and
operations officer's perspectives due to player limitations.
The following subsections provide a brief description of the
actions performed for each step of the process.
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2 . Define Current State
The current state was defined from the initial
information base. This information base consists of data
which already exists in the system from previous operations
and data provided from the division operations order. Data
in the information base is categorized as friendly force
information, information about the enemy and common
information. Each category is described in the following
subsections.
a. Friendly Force Information
Friendly force information is data which
describes the size, location and activity of higher, lower
and adjacent units in the force. Based on the new task
organization, the brigade staff seeks updates from all
assigned and attached units in accordance with prescribed
reporting procedures. For the simulation, the only units
explicitly reporting to the brigade operations center were
the four maneuver battalions and two artillery battalions.
The situation map was updated with unit locations,
boundaries and control measures imposed by the new mission.
Activity and location of immediate adjacent units was also
plotted.
The principal attributes of friendly subordinate
maneuver units which were monitored in the simulation were
location and weapon system strength. The same attributes
were monitored for the supporting artillery units. The data
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generated by company situation reports is technical detailed
information. This data is aggregated at battalion level to
provide a picture of the battalion's combat power.
Subordinate unit data concerning location and activity was
transformed to define a front line trace. In this paper,
such aggregated data will be referred to as staff or command
information. The primary difference between the two types
is the level of detail contained in the information. In
most cases, for any existing item of command information,
there is an available staff information file derived from
technical data which can be examined by the commander to
gain further insight into the condition.
In terms of the theory of combat power presented
in Section III, the basic measure of combat power in the
maneuver company is the number of fully manned major weapon
systems. For a heavy company/ team, the major weapon systems
are the tank, and the infantry fighting vehicle with crews.
The mix of these weapons is indicated by designation of the
company/team as mechanized, armor or balanced.
In his book, On The Banks Of The Suez , Major
General Avraham Adan provides a detailed account of the
actions of the Israeli Armored Division which he commanded
during the Arab-Israeli War of October, 1973. His book
supports the above measure of combat power as well as the
fact that continuous cross leveling of men to weapon systems
is executed in the company/team in combat. [Ref. 22] A
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mismatch of personnel and weapon systems reduces the combat
power of the com pany/ team . The company leadership
continuously strives to minimize this effect by cross
leveling. Based on this methodology, the company commander
reports his actual combat condition by reporting the number
of fully manned major weapon systems currently on hand and
the binding constraint if a mismatch develops between
personnel and weapon systems. As combat continues, fuel,
ammunition, leadership, maintenance and fatigue may
constrain combat power but assuming that these conditions
are managed effectively, the primary index of maneuver
combat power is manning of major weapon systems. The
corresponding status report submitted by the company/team is
the basis for staff policies and leadership decisions for
the maneuver force.
A similar argument is made for the fire support
technical subsystem. Mortar, tube artillery and missile
systems are the basic components of combat power which are
manned to support the maneuver force. Manning of the
control systems which link these systems to the maneuver
force is implied. Similar approaches may be adapted in some
manner to the other technical subsystems of the force.
These aggregated subsystem descriptions are developed by the
brigade coordinating staff. They provide the commander with
an integrated definition of the current condition of the
friendly force. This definition is refined by the
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commander's experience and personal evaluation of unit
leadership and battlefield conditions. In addition to
definition of the current state, the periodic reports
tracked over time enable the brigade commander; and his staff
to identify trends in subordinate units which require
changes or adjustments. Specific examples of current state
representation and trend analysis are presented in Section
VI.
Using this methodology, the four maneuver
battalions assigned to the brigade were defined in terms of
fully manned weapon systems. Two were pure armor battalions
at 100% strength and two were pure mechanized infantry at
100% strength. The two medium artillery battalions were
also at 100% strength.
b. Enemy Force Information
A similar methodology was applied to the enemy
force. However, during the simulation, intelligence
gathering was not explicitly modeled except for intelligence
obtained from subordinate units engaged in combat. The
enemy force current state may be developed in a similar
manner to the friendly force techniques described above.
The brigade intelligence system strives to develop an
accurate picture of the array of enemy forces which oppose
the brigade. Employing techniques suggested by AirLand
Battle Doctrine, the enemy force array is divided into
threat sectors based on time horizons. Analysis of
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identified force arrays may provide a measure of the
relative combat power of opposing forces in the brigade area
of interest. This is the sector of immediate concern to the
brigade commander. By further tracking the change in
strength and activity of the enemy force in this sector, the
brigade intelligence officer may be able to identify a
pattern which confirms a specific enemy course of action
from the several possible alternatives. In this manner, the
intelligence system may employ quantitative techniques to
reduce uncertainty about the enemy situation.
Research material reviewed for this thesis
indicates that the intelligence community has made
significant progress in this area. Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield (IPB) techniques described in FM 100-5
are a key example. In a sense, each technical subsystem of
the brigade prepares the battlefield with respect to the
enemy threat to plan the execution of its portion of the
brigade operation. Due to player personnel limitations,
intelligence gathering analytic techniques were not employed
in the delay simulation. This area might be examined in
detail as a follow-on study which uses the theoretical
framework of this thesis to develop specific techniques,
c. Common Information
Common information includes information about
the environment of combat in the brigade sector. Time
horizons are employed to project weather, terrain and
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visibility conditions. The brigade immediate area of
interest consisting of the covering force sector and the
main defensive sector was divided into subsections for
detailed analysis. The basis for phase line divisions was
the identification of a basic change in the nature or
traf f icability of terrain or a natural terrain feature which
transits the sector. In Figure 3, for example. Sector A is
open terrain while Sector B is a more forested area. Phase
Line Three in the same figure coincides with the Haune
River. Characterization of the terrain in terms of
mobility, intervisibil ity cover and concealment enabled
matching of force types (armor, mechanized infantry or
balanced) to the terrain. The phase lines identify sectors
in which transition problems might be expected as, for
example, the case in which a pure armor unit transitions
from open high mobility terrain to densely forested terrain
with restricted fields of fire and mobility. The principal
tool employed for this analysis was the standard military
map.
Another common item of information of importance
is the activity and control of the indigenous population.
This information may indicate potential for force




The data elements described above are aggregated by
the brigade coordinating staff to provide a command
perception of the current situation in terms of the friendly
force, enemy force and environment. In the past, these
perceptions were presented to the commander for analysis in
a manually prepared staff briefing. Automation of this
process may reduce error and increase the responsiveness of
the staff to the commander's decision information
requirements. A significant reduction in decision cycle
time may be achieved while appropriate design of the
information products may enhance the accuracy of the
commander's perception of the current state.
At this point in the process, the commander and
operations officer have reviewed the current condition of
friendly forces, opposing enemy forces and the environment
in the context of the newly assigned mission. Available
maneuver and fire support resources for the delay were
identified. Ammunition, fuel, personnel and leadership did
not appear to be limiting constraints for execution of the
delay.
3 . Specify Criteria For Mission Success
During this step, the newly assigned mission was
analyzed to determine criteria which quantify mission
success. The three dimensions of these criteria for the
maneuver (terrain controlling) forces were time, terrain and
force level in terms of fully manned major combat systems.
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The concept of tracking force levels in terms of
fully manned combat systems is expected to be controversial.
However, it is a true representation of the net combat power
of the maneuver force and is the basis of the commander's
decisions concerning immediate future operations whether it
is explicitly stated or not. General Adan's description of
his decisions in combat support this assertion. [Ref. 22]
The brigade mission was defined in two distinct
phases. The first phase required the brigade to delay east
of the Fulda River for six hours after the enemy initiated
an attack across the international boundary. Figure 3
dimensions display this as a requirement to delay over a
distance of twenty-two kilometers for a period of six hours.
The end force level goal established for this phase was for
the brigade to attain at least sixty percent of authorized
strength of fully manned major ground combat systems. This
is a minimum goal for the completion of the delay in the
dimensions of time (six hours), terrain (approximately
twenty-two kilometers) and force level (sixty percent of
authorized fully manned major combat systems). This goal
becomes the starting condition for the second phase of the
brigade mission; the defense in sector operation. In the
simulation, the brigade operation was only executed for the
delay. Though not examined in detail, it appears that
criteria may be more difficult to quantify for a sector
defense. This definition of the desired goals for the
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brigade delay in terms of quantifiable criteria was the
basis for comparing alternatives later in the process. The
delay end condition criteria was also projected forward in
time to the starting conditions by imposing corresponding
goals on each phase line in the covering force area. At
each phase line, the corresponding goal in the dimensions of
time and force levels was recorded on the map to enable
comparison of the current and desired state. This discrete
technique of periodic comparison may be executed more
frequently using automated continuous projections which are
explained in detail in Section VI.
4 . Compare Current Versus Desired State
This step is an explicit comparison of the current
and desired state to determine the magnitude of the
discrepancy which exists. In the delay simulation, the
brigade was in an assembly area. Major troop movements,
task organization and tactical planning were required to
execute the newly assigned mission. A decision was made by
the commander to execute a formal planning process to
formulate the initial plan. Reorganization and relocation
of forces was required to execute a significantly different
scheme of maneuver and plan for support.
5 . Analyze Time Available
The commander and operations officer projected a
time schedule for the non-concurrent phases of the
operation. This was executed in a backward planning
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sequence beginning with the defense in Sector from H+ 6 to
H+ 1 2 hours, delay from H to H+6 hours, occupation and
improvement of initial delay positions from H-3 to H hour,
movement to initial delay positions from H-5 to H-3 hours,
subordinate unit reorganization from H-6 to H-5 hours and
formulation of the warning order from H-8 to H-6 hours.
This estimate clarified the time available for initial
planning and the general sequence of non-concurrent actions
which were required for maneuver units to accomplish the
mission.
6 . Analyze Weather And Terrain In The Operational Area
The common information in the information base was
examined to identify constraints on friendly and enemy
courses of action. Potential primary and secondary avenues
of approach into the brigade sector were identified. A
particular aspect of terrain for the delay which was
examined was the effect of terrain and obstacles on the
mobility and flexibility of the delaying force. Delay
channels and their flow capacities were identified. Delay
Sector C was extremely restrictive to rearward movement of
forces. These constraints were carried forward to the
generation of alternatives. Simulated weather was clear
summer daylight.
7. Analyze Enemy Capabilities
As stated earlier, the enemy situation was treated
as highly uncertain for the simulation. The division
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operations order indicated at least an enemy division
attacking in the brigade sector. The exact location and
size of enemy forces was not known. An attack across the
international border was expected no earlier than eight
hours from the receipt of the division operations order.
The division order indicated that the enemy main effort was
expected in the brigade sector. Terrain and uncertainty of
the enemy force dispositions suggested relatively uniform
lateral distribution of defending forces in the delay
sector.
8. Analyze Forces Available To Execute The Mission
The information base was queried to examine the
composition of maneuver forces available in terms of
leadership and major combat systems. Critical supporting
systems were also quickly reviewed to determine support
capabilities and limitations. Fire support, engineer and
air defense were considered to be at full strength and
adequate for the mission. Principal constraints identified
were time and available maneuver forces.
9
.
Generate Alternative Courses Of Action
"Delay is a mission that requires a unit to trade
space for time without losing freedom of maneuver, risking
penetration, or being bypassed. The delaying force may
attack, defend, ambush, raid or use any other tactic
necessary to accomplish the mission." [Ref. 23: p. 2-34]
The doctrinal basis for alternatives was supplemented by the
division operation order. Continued retention of terrain in
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the delay sector was not required. The covering force
mission implies the goal to inflict heavy casualties on the
leading elements of the attacking force while preserving the
strength of the delaying force for later employment in the
defense in sector. A technique which was employed was to
generate alternatives which successively increased the
forward concentration of maneuver forces in the delay
sector. This technique involved the allocation of
appropriate type forces to terrain. Sector A favored
employment of armor units, Sector B favored employment of
balanced units and Sector C and D favored mechanized
infantry units. All courses of action were developed with a
subsequent plan for a forward defense along the Fulda River.
The Fulda River was considered to be decisive terrain in the
simulation. Course of Action I deployed an armor battalion
in Sector A, two balanced battalions in Sector B and a
mechanized infantry battalion in reserve consolidating
defensive positions along Phase Line Four (Fulda River).
Course of Action II deployed two armor battalions in Sector
A, and two mechanized infantry battalions in Sector C to
execute a successive delay. Course of Action III deployed
three balanced battalions in Sector A and a balanced
battalion in Sector C as a reserve. Divisional cavalry
assets were considered adequate for rear area protection.
Basically, each course of action allocated maneuver forces
to direct combat, reserves and rear area security.
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1 . Analysis Of Alternatives
In August, 1983, the specific analytic tools for
alternative analysis which are discussed in Section VI had
not been developed. They are a product of the simulation.
The basic criteria used for analysis of alternatives in the
simulation were adequate coverage of terrain, supportability
and flexibility. The restrictive terrain in Sector C was a
major factor in alternative analysis. It appeared that this
terrain would not only slow the advance of the attacking
force but would also complicate delay execution if the
brigade's forces were concentrated forward initially.
Forward concentration would also reduce the resources
available for preparation of the main defensive positions
along the Fulda River. This analysis led to the elimination
of Courses of Action II and III.
1 1
.
Commander ' s Decision And Detailed Guidance
Based on the criteria of adequate coverage,
supportability and flexibility, Course of Action I was
selected as the most desirable alternative. The commander's
guidance was to execute the delay in three phases. Phase I
involved the delay battle fought by the Armor Battalion in
Sector A from H to H+2 hours. Phase II consisted of a
passage of lines at Phase Line two by the delaying armor
battalion through the two balanced task forces. Phase III
was the execution of a delay by the two balanced task forces
in Sectors C and D from H+2 to H + 6 hours. The commander's
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guidance included emphasis on forward positioning of fire
support assets and the necessity for continuous lateral
coordination with adjacent maneuver units during the delay.
Priority of support was initially to the armor battalion and
then to the balanced task force in the southern portion of
the brigade sector after the passage of lines. After the
passage of lines, the armor battalion would move to the
Haune River area to serve as the brigade reserve. The
mission of the mechanized infantry battalion at Phase Line
Four was to prepare the main defensive positions and to




Based on the scheme of maneuver, forces were task
organized to execute the assigned mission. Maneuver
reorganization sought to minimize changes in the current
configuration of task forces. A similar approach was
employed for allocation of support. This was explicitly
executed for maneuver and fire support but implicit for
other subsystems such as engineer, air defense and signal.
1 3 Formulate Movement And Security Plan
The movement and security plans were developed to
schedule and coordinate the movement of the brigade from the
assembly area to initial positions dictated by the
commander's guidance. The movement plan indicated routes,
time schedules and control points for each subordinate unit.
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The security plan provided for horizontal security using
reconnaissance forces and vertical security using air
defense assets along movement routes. This information was
provided to subordinate units to begin execution of the new
mission.
1 4. Formulate Maneuver^ Support And Contingency Plans
This step involves the development of detailed
instructions and overlays which constitute the formal
brigade operations order with annexes. This step in the
sequence was not formally executed for the simulation. The
operations plan is formulated by the brigade staff and
transmitted to subordinate units for detailed planning and
execution. As units begin execution of the new mission, the
brigade command control system begins execution of the
control cycle phase of the command control process.
H. CONTROL CYCLE
The control cycle for the brigade delay was based on
periodic updating of the information reported by subordinate
units and the commander's observation of the battlefield.
This information was aggregated to gain understanding of the
current state of friendly and enemy forces in the dimensions
of time, location, activity and weapon systems strength.
These conditions were then compared with the goal
established for the force during the initial planning phase
to determine if an unacceptable discrepancy existed. The
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comparison also sought situations in which the force was far
exceeding goals and might be able to seize the initiative by
execution of a limited counterattack or ambush. First
Battle did not seem to effectively model these potentially
high payoff situations. The following subsections describe




Based on the results of each thirty minute game
turn, the time, location, activity and weapon system
strength of each maneuver company and field artillery
battery was recorded. A front line trace approximation was
obtained from the mapboard. Task force and brigade
strengths were aggregated from company reports. The result
was a descriptive status of the brigade in terms of time,
location, activity and weapon system strength.
2. Update Desired State
The desired state was the goal for the brigade in
the dimensions of time, location and weapon system strength.
During the delay si mula t ion ,succes s i ve goals were
established for each delay phase line. As the brigade front
line trace crossed each phase line, a comparison could be
made between the current and desired state. Initially, the
desired state for maneuver forces was fixed for each phase
line but later alternative generations (fragmentary orders)




3 . Compare Current And Desired State
Using the criteria of location, time and weapon
system strength, the operations officer was able to monitor
and evaluate mission execution. The commander was advised
of mission progress and situations which required tradeoff
analysis. Quite frequently, the brigade was on or ahead of
its time schedule with respect to terrain but was losing
weapon systems in combat at a rate greater than anticipated.
Such a condition suggested a change in maneuver tactics or
engagement techniques. These conflicts between the current
and desired state required adjustments to the plan. When no
adjustment was required, appropriate units were advised.
4 . Analyze Time Available
In contrast to the initial planning sequence, this
time analysis is based on the trend which has developed
during the current operation. The commander and the
operations officer examined an unacceptable condition to
determine the time remaining before the unacceptable
condition could no longer be corrected with resources
organic to the brigade. This was a subjective evaluation in
the simulated delay which may be enhanced by trend analysis
techniques presented in Section VI. The result of this time
analysis was a timeline which identified time available for
planning, movement and execution.
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5 . Generate Alternatives
The first step in alternative generation was
establishment of a cause-and -effect relationship for the
identified discrepancy. In the cases of excessive losses
and force time schedules exceeded, the brigade elements were
accepting too much close combat or decisive engagement.
This is an obvious simplification in the simulation but
reflects an example of the inferences which may be drawn by
the brigade commander and his staff. Other real causes
could be m isa 1 loca
t
ion of fire support or engineer
countermobility resources. The cause -and-effeet analysis
and time available were the constrained basis for developing
feasible alternatives to correct discrepancies. The
commander searched his force assets and experience for
adjustments to correct the discrepancy.
The concept of cause-and-ef f ect analysis raises some
key issues when compared with the concept of "...turning
inside the enemy's decision cycle." [Ref. 24: p. 2] During
the simulation, the defender's method was to formulate and
execute a simple, sound and flexible tactical plan which
integrated maneuver and fire support to achieve maximum
combat power over time. During the first two hours of the
simulation, this plan was followed explicitly to identify
trends in a stable situation. These initial trends enabled
the commander to predict the future condition of the brigade
if current operational policies continued. This prediction
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was the basis for policy adjustments. In contrast, the
"turning inside the enemy's decision cycle" concept
frustrates attempts at cause -and -ef feet analysis and
threatens system stability. If this technique had been
employed, less analysis of the effects of subsystem
interaction could have been performed to suggest alternative
policies for resource allocation. The authors believe that
this approach to tactical decisionmaking in a complex combat
system contributes to system instability, dangerous
oscillation and may have disastrous consequences over time.
Some alternatives which might be generated in actual
combat are changes to personnel and crew replacement
procedures, changes in electronic warfare priorities,
changes in tactics employed by maneuver combat systems and
units, changes in the allocation of fire support assets,
changes in priorities of engineer tasks, changes in the
composition or location of maintenance contact teams and
changes in the type or quantity of ammunition supplied to
combatants. Most of these alternatives could not be
examined or applied in the First Battle Simulation. The
primary alternative which was examined and invoked was a
change in maneuver tactics.
6 . Analyze Alternatives
In actual combat, this analysis would be performed
by the commander and appropriate members of his coordinating
staff within the time constraint. During the simulation.
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the limitations of the First Battle model and player
personnel restricted the range of alternatives and the
detail of analysis. Section VI suggests some techniques
which might be employed for alternative analysis to correct
deficiencies in the current execution of the plan.
7. Commander ' s Decision And Guidance
This step is similar to the corresponding step in
the initial planning process. During the simulation, the
primary change in guidance was to avoid decisive engagement
by attacking forces. Whenever a close combat situation
developed, the brigade commander was directly involved in
the decision to fight or disengage. Each case was examined
in detail in relation to the condition of adjacent delaying




During the simulation, fragmentary order formulation
was executed by a brief analysis and discussion following
each game turn which set the adjusted tactics and general
plan for the subsequent game turn. This action corresponds
to the feedback, and adjustments to plan execution which
would be directed by the brigade commander and his staff.
I. DISCUSSION OF THE SIMULATION
This cyclical process was repeated for each game turn of
the First Battle simulation of the brigade delay. The
simulation ended after five hours and thirty minutes of
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simulated combat with the brigade weapon system strength at
approximately fifty five percent. The brigade was
positioned for the defense in sector at the west bank of the
Fulda River.
The delay simulation appeared to support the general
process model described in Section IV. The following
section presents data obtained from the simulation to
demonstrate specific analytic tools which might be employed







The preceding sections of this thesis have developed a
framework to define the force command control system. The
brigade commander and his staff accomplish force integration
of the technical subsystems in the force as they execute the
force command control process. Each technical subsystem has
its own technical command control system which executes
intensive management of subsystem assets to support the
force operations plan. The focus of all other technical
subsystems is protection and support of the maneuver
technical subsystem as it prepares for, executes and
recovers from combat operations. The objective of the force
is to defeat the enemy force while preserving its own
capability to continue the fight. The combat force achieves
this by synchronization or peaking of combat power at the
critical place and time on the battlefield. [Ref. 2: p. 2-
3] The mechanism for synchronization is the force command
control process.
Sections IV and V of this thesis specified and examined
a model of the force command control process for a heavy
brigade executing a delay in a European scenario. This
section suggests specific analytic techniques which might be
employed by the brigade command control system to achieve
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synchronization on the AirLand Battlefield. The techniques
are presented in sequence as they might be employed in the
process model presented in Section IV. Data obtained from
the simulation described in Section V provide examples of
the techniques. While the focus of these techniques is on
description and prediction of the maneuver force condition,
similar techniques might be developed and employed for each
of the other technical subsystems.
B. CONSTRAINTS ON ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES
The techniques presented in this section depend on
automated support within the command control system. The
first automated support component is an effective
communications system within the maneuver force and across
technical subsystems. Conceptually the communications
system would contain digital data links which automatically
encode, transmit and decode manually entered company level
report data. The second automated support component is the
Maneuver Control System (MCS) or other computer system which
automatically stores, aggregates and may evaluate data
received from subordinate units. The third automated
support component is a remote terminal device which is
linked to the MCS data base. This terminal is operated by
the trained personnel of the force headquarters to develop
force information, perform analysis, prepare plans and
orders and monitor execution of plans and orders. The
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analytic techniques presented in this section may require
substantial modification for manual execution in the absence
of the above automated system components.
C. DATA SOURCES FOR FORCE INFORMATION
The force information base is initialized and updated
from standardized reports. For maneuver units, these
reports are specified in the Maneuver Control System User's
Guide. Similar standard reports are provided to the force
command control element by the other technical subsystems of
the force. These subsystem reports are compiled by the
special and coordinating staff officers of the brigade
headquarters element. The intelligence section initializes
and updates the enemy and environmental situation while the
operations officer provides the corresponding information
for the friendly forces.
An additional component of the data base which is
proposed in this section is a table of parameters for use in
outcome predictions. These parameters are dependent on
terrain, level of combat and type of force employed. The
parameters would specify loss rates for major weapon
systems, fuel consumption rates and ammunition consumption
rates. The parameters might be obtained from combat
simulations and could be improved by analysis of actual
combat data. These parametric techniques are proposed as a
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supplement to command and staff experience estimates of
probable outcomes.
In the case of mechanized infantry and armor units, the
Maneuver Control System Commander's Report quantifies the
maneuver unit condition in terms of the number of fully
manned tanks, the number of fully manned infantry fighting
vehicles, unit location, time, current level and type of
combat activity, and aggregate fuel and ammunition status.
The parametric analysis proposed above suggests that each
measurable level of the unit may be modeled over time,
terrain and projected combat to predict the future condition
of the unit. This approach enables relative comparison of
alternatives and may suggest specific policies for refueling
or rearming for a specific alternative.
This proposal recognizes the qualitative aspects of a
unit's condition. Such aspects include unit morale,
leadership, training, cohesiveness and fatigue. The
commander and staff perform this qualitative analysis and
merge the results with the quantitative techniques to arrive
at the best decision. At a minimum, the quantitative
approach may identify undesirable time, distance and force




D. ANALYTICS IN THE INITIAL PLANNING SEQUENCE
The Initial Planning Process model presented as Figure 4
has been coded with numbers to identify specific steps in
the process which have potential for application of
quantitative analysis. The proposed quantitative techniques
use data in the information base, input from the brigade
decision group and combat parameters to assist the brigade
decision group in the planning, execution and control of
combat operations. This discussion is limited primarily to
the actions of the brigade commander, intelligence officer
and operations officer. Applications for other members of
the coordinating and special staff are discussed only as
they contribute to the commander's decision process. The
decision group employs these quantitative tools as well as
qualitative judgment to execute the command control process.
The following subsections correspond numerically to the
specific numbered steps of the process model in Figure 4.
Each subsection elaborates specific quantitative tools which
might be employed within the respective step of the process.
1 . Define Current State
The procedures employed in this step of the process
consist primarily of aggregated descriptions of the current
situation using maps, graphical displays and text
supplements to provide clarification to graphs. The
techniques presented are representative of the procedures
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Figure 4. Initial Planning Process Model (Numbered)
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Germany. The VII (U.S.) Corps procedures were demonstrated
to the authors during a visit to CACDA at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas in May, 1983.
The first procedure is detailed examination of an
updated map display which identifies the most recently
reported locations of major friendly and enemy units. The
display employs standard military symbols and control
measures to depict current force dispositions. This display
may be presented on a terminal as well as on a standard
manually posted map display. The MCS literature suggests
that a "plasma" device may be developed to replace the
manually posted map board. The map analysis provides the
command group with a gross description of the current
situation.
This gross description is refined by a standard
sequence of information graphics and text supplements which
provide the commander with specific information about the
friendly force status, enemy situation and environmental
conditions. Figure 5 is an example of a presentation of
current force status. This graph is based on each technical
subsystem commander's evaluation of his subsystem's
capability to support the force. Specific subsystem
limitations are identified in a text supplement. Figure 6
is an example of an underlying detailed description of the
current status of maneuver battalions which is aggregated to
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Figure 6. Current Maneuver Status
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display is developed by the brigade operations officer.
Figure 7 is a similar display which represents the current
condition of the fire support subsystem. This display is
developed by the brigade fire support officer. Appropriate
graphical representations of the other technical subsystems
would complete a command update of the friendly force
situation.
The brigade intelligence officer might formulate
similar descriptions of the enemy force from intelligence
reports and analysis. Such analysis might include force
ratio descriptions of enemy versus friendly maneuver, fire
support or other capabilities. The brigade intelligence
officer also provides a summary of the impact of weather and
terrain on the new mission.
The commander reviews this information in the
context of the newly assigned mission. He is seeking
information to limit his implicit alternatives by detailed
examination of friendly force limitations, enemy
capabilities and predicted environmental conditions.
2 . Specify Criteria for Mission Success
The commander executes a rapid analysis of the
assigned mission in the dimensions of time, terrain and
resources consumed. This is a goal setting process achieved
by examination of the mission. "...Forward-backward
planning is carried out within two limits. One is fixed in
the present by the actors and available resources; the other
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Figure 7. Current Fire Support Status
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is fixed in the future by the desired objectives." [Ref.
25: p. 124] The commander specifies the goals of the force
in terms of location, time and maneuver strength consistent
with the force level planning horizon. For the brigade, the
planning horizon might be twelve hours from the present.
This specified goal establishes a basis for development and
evaluation of alternatives. Techniques employed in this
step are a blend of experience, time-distance computations
and brief terrain analysis.
3 . Analyze Time Available
A backplanning sequence is executed to identify the
non-concurrent activities which must be performed to begin
execution of the new mission. A prompting system might be
invoked to assist in this analysis. This prompt would be
dependent on the type mission to be performed and might
invoke a time-versus- distance algorithm to determine
expected movement time for brigade displacement. The
critical output of this analysis is a suspense time for
dissemination of the warning order. The analysis also
enhances the understanding by the commander and key staff of
critical activities which must be performed to initiate
execution of the new mission.
4. Analyze Weather and Terrain
Several tools might be employed in this step using a
limited terrain model. The model might be a graphic display
which presents color coding of terrain mobility in the
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brigade sector. This display would clarify avenues of
approach into the brigade sector and might also identify key
obstacles such as rivers or densely forested areas. For the
delay mission, this analysis included characterization of
the terrain in terms of the type maneuver force which was
best suited for employment in each sector. Figure 8 shows a
dimensional analysis of the delay terrain divided into
sectors. This schematic was used for the delay simulation
to formulate alternatives which allocated appropriate forces
to terrain and provided adequate lateral coverage. The
diagram also facilitated time versus distance computations.
5 . Analyze Forces Available
During this step in the process, the brigade
commander and operations officer concentrate on the
allocation of maneuver forces to the missions of direct
combat, reserves and rear area protection. The commander
reviews the current composition of available maneuver
battalions with respect to the newly assigned mission and
terrain. This analysis also involves an evaluation of the
current command control capability of each maneuver
battalion to determine if cross - level ing or other
reorganization is required.
6 . Generate Alternatives
The commander and operations officer generate
courses of action which successively increase the allocation







Figure 8. Brigade Delay Sector Dimensional Analysis
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reduction of forces allocated to reserves and rear area
protection. For each course of action, a phased maneuver
concept, task organization and timeline are specified. This
technique was employed for the simulated delay. Each course
of action generated was based on terrain as well as forces
available. If a subsequent mission is stated, the desired
starting condition for the subsequent mission establishes
the end condition for the initial mission. All courses of
action should result in a reasonable transition of forces to
the specified starting condition of the subsequent mission.
This technique is based on the concept of exploratory
scenarios proposed by Thomas Saaty. [Ref. 25: p. 125] The
commander and operations officer might develop schedules for
each alternative on the map board to generate the timeline
and sequence of combat activities. This technique is
constrained by the planning time available.
7 . Analysis of Alternatives
Up to this point in the process, the principal
participants in planning and analysis of the new mission
have been the brigade commander, operations officer and
intelligence officer. The other members of the brigade
staff provided input to the commander's information update
which highlighted subsystem limitations. Based on this
input, the commander executed the planning sequence which
resulted in a finite set of maneuver alternatives. These
alternatives are now examined by each technical subsystem
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commander and staff for s uppor tab i 1 i ty . While the
supporting subsystems staff officers perform their analyses,
the brigade operations and intelligence officers perform a
detailed analysis of alternatives with respect to maneuver
outcomes
.
The basis for the maneuver analysis is the
projection of baseline or normative outcomes in terms of
surviving fully manned weapon systems over time. The input
data for this analysis is the starting strength of each
maneuver battalion, the level of combat over time for each
battalion and the type terrain over time for each battalion.
The projection employed for the delay simulation was an
exponential type decay function but might also have been
approximated with a linear decay model. Data from the delay
simulation was analyzed to obtain representative normative
decay rates. Figure 9 provides an example of the results of
this type of predictive model for a specific course of
action. The course of action analyzed was Course of Action
I which committed TF1-12 (ARMOR) in Sector A and TF1 -1
(Balanced) and TF1-92 (Balanced) in Sectors B and C. All
units were committed in the subsequent sector defense. The
brigade result is an aggregation of the results of each of
the battalion parametric analyses. Figures 10 and 11
provide a detailed description of Ml and IFV strengths over
time for the same scenario. As a further example of this
technique. Figure 12 shows the case of a prediction which
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Figure 9. Maneuver Force Outcome Projection,
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Ml TANK STRENGTH PREDICTED OUTCOME
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Figure 10. Ml Tank. Outcome Projection,
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Figure 11. TOW (IFV) Outcome Projection
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WEAPON SYSTEMS PREDICTED OUTCOME (WITH REINFORCEMENTS)






























Figure 12. Maneuver Force Outcome Projection With Reserve
Committed at H+6 Hours.
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involves a commitment of a reserve tank company to the
brigade at H+6 hours. The method proposed is flexible and
may be adjusted for lateral repositioning of forces.
An alternative approach to the parametric analysis
of alternatives described above is a subjective prediction
of battalion loss rates for each phase of the operation.
These projections are made by the brigade commander or
operations officer and are aggregated to create an expected
brigade outcome for each alternative. The result is a
piecewise linear approximation which may be used to compare
alternatives. Figure 13 is an example of a piecewise linear
approximation for Course of Action I for the delay
simulation.
Regardless of technique, the consolidated result
would be a graph of the form shown in Figure 14. This
specific figure was generated by parametric analysis of the
three courses of action developed for the simulated brigade
delay. This forecast provides a method for comparing
alternative maneuver courses of action and may expose
clearly unacceptable alternatives. In Figure 14, it appears
that Course of Action III is dominated by the other courses
of action in terms of surviving weapon systems. The
magnitude of dominance, in this particular case, is not
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The exponential or linear loss rate approximating
techniques suggested above are employed to execute
comparative analysis of maneuver alternatives. They provide
a technique which quantifies the maneuver battle for each
alternative. The parameters used for the example were based
on a single iteration of First Battle and should be examined
in that context. The simple deterministic approach is
proposed as an alternative to a detailed high resolution
simulation which would probably be unresponsive to the
immediate needs of the commander and which would probably
also exceed the capacity of the automated systems.
Similar analyses of maneuver alternatives are
performed by each supporting technical subsystem
representative. The specific techniques employed would
require a technical support analysis of each maneuver
alternative to identify resource constraints which place the
alternative at risk. An example might be a determination by
the engineers that a maneuver course of action exceeded
available bridging capabilities. These resource limitations
are the basis for support subsystem inputs to the decision
process. The proposed input mechanism for these support
subsystem analyses is an ordinal ranking system which at
least identifies maneuver courses of action which are at
risk due to supporting resource constraints.
A feasibility evaluation of each maneuver
alternative by each support subsystem might be a binary
104

indicator variable (zero or one) which indicates that the
alternative is supportable (one) or exceeds support
resources (zero). Coordinating staff officers might act to
reduce "zero" situations by resource tradeoffs across
subsystems or by force augmentation from external (division)
resources. Explanation of all unresolved "zero" conditions
would be provided to the force commander for consideration
prior to his decision.
A preference evaluation of each maneuver alternative
by each support subsystem might involve pairwise comparison
of each maneuver alternative with the other maneuver
alternatives. In The Analytic- Hierarchy Process , Thomas L.
Saaty describes a method for employing this technique.
[Ref. 26] Saaty proposes an ordinal ranking scale which
ranges from 1 to 9. Pairwise comparisons result in
reciprocal rankings of alternatives. Numerical techniques
are employed to determine relative preference of
alternatives. These rankings might be aggregated for all
force subsystems to obtain a force preference evaluation of
alternatives. This preference evaluation approach may
exceed the force commander's requirements. The feasibility
evaluation of maneuver alternatives by the support




8 . Commander ' s Decision and Detailed Guidance
The quantitative analysis of maneuver alternatives
is combined with the force commander's qualitative
evaluation to achieve a decision concerning the specific
maneuver course of action to be executed. The commander
clarifies his concept of the maneuver battle to the brigade
operations officer and subordinate maneuver commanders.
This clarification might include specification of
quantitative goals for maneuver units in the dimensions of
time, location and weapon system.
The brigade operations officer employs this guidance
to establish normative performance envelopes for each
battalion or task force and an aggregated envelope for the
brigade. Figure 15 is an example of weapon system
performance envelopes. These envelopes were based on the
scheme of maneuver for the simulated brigade delay. They
were derived from the piecewise linear approximation shown
at Figure 13. The lower bound of the weapon system
performance envelopes represents a ten percent negative
deviation from the commander's goal. If the brigade or
subordinate task force strengths approach this bound, an
unsatisfactory condition exists which may require a change
or adjustment to the maneuver plan or allocation of support
resources. This graphical technique is a primary tool which
may be used by the operations officer during the control
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Figure 15. Brigade Weapon System Performance Envelopes
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2D BRIGADE FRONT LINE TRACE ENVELOPE












Figure 16. Brigade Front Line Trace Performance Envelope,
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example of a brigade front line trace performance envelope.
This specific envelope was also based on the scheme of
maneuver for the simulated brigade delay. The upper bound
of the front line trace envelope represents a twelve percent
deviation from the commander's goal. This envelope assists
the brigade operations officer to track unit performance
with respect to delay rate over time to identify marginal or
unacceptable conditions. Use of these tools will be
demonstrated in the following sections which examine the
control cycle.
The envelopes presented in Figures 15 and 16 are
generated based on the brigade commander's clarifying
guidance. The weapon system performance envelope in Figure
15 was developed by generation of a plus or minus ten
percent region about the commander's expectation shown in
Figure 13. The size of the region indicates the degree of
sensitivity which the commander desires. The boundary of
the specified region is the commander's explicit threshold.
If the boundary is approached or exceeded, the commander
expects to be notified and involved in formulation of
remedial action.
The techniques presented above are designed to
assist the brigade commander and his staff in the
development and relative comparison of force alternatives to
accomplish a newly assigned mission. A sequence of standard
procedures is executed which assists the commander in his
109

analysis of the current situation and the projection of
alternative outcomes. Supporting subsystems provide input
to the brigade commander's decision process. The
coordinating staff provides a filtering mechanism for this
input as it seeks to resolve conflicts or resource
constraints which may limit the brigade alternatives.
These proposals are not all inclusive but suggest a
starting point for analytic techniques which have potential
for application with the advent of automated components in
the force command control system.
E. ANALYTICS IN THE CONTROL CYCLE
The brigade operations plan has been disseminated to
subordinate units for execution. The brigade commander
leads the maneuver force in the aggressive execution of the
plan. The brigade staff coordinates execution by monitoring
the situation, by comparison of actual battle conditions
with explicit expectations and by subsequent identification
of opportunities or discrepancies. The brigade staff may
employ analytic techniques within the control cycle to
identify trends and discrepancies. Steps of the control
cycle which suggest such applications are numbered in Figure
17. The following subsections correspond numerically to



















































Figure 17. Control Cycle Process Model (Numbered)
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Several figures are presented in this section to provide
examples of the force condition over time. These examples
are based on the actual data obtained from the delay
simulation and the performance envelopes presented in
Figures 15 and 16. Figure 18 is an example of the unit
performance envelopes developed for the brigade delay. The
reader should note that the two graphs at the top of the
figure reflect the brigade goal for weapon system strength
and front line trace over time. Figures 19 through 21
present the actual sample data points obtained from the
delay simulation at H+ 2 , H+ 4 , and H+ 6 hours respectively.
These figures graphically display the comparison of the
current and desired state. They assist the staff to
identify discrepancies. Figure 22 is an example of a linear
regression analysis of data obtained from the first two
hours of the simulated delay. This regression technique
might be applied to quantify the trends of current tactical
operations and to make limited predictions of the future
condition of the force. It is extremely important that the
reader understand that these predictive techniques rely
heavily on stable conditions of combat for short periods of
time. If a sound operational plan is being executed, the
necessary stability to make predictions about the future may
be induced. The regression model of recent combat may





































Figure 18. Unit Performance Envelopes
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UNIT PERFORMANCE ENVELOPES WITH FIRST BAHLE
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Figure 19. Brigade Performance at H+2 Hours
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UNIT PERFORMANCE ENVELOPES WITH FIRST BATTLE
DATA AT H+4 HOURS
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Figure 20. Brigade Performance at H+4 Hours
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UNIT PERFORMANCE ENVELOPES WITH FIRST BATTLE
DATA AT H+6 HOURS
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Figure 21 . Brigade Performance at H+6 Hours
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REGRESSION OF REAL TIME DATA
2D BRIGADE SITUATION AT 2 HOURS
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Figure 22. Regression Application to Brigade Delay,
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1 . Update Current State
Subordinate unit situation reports are processed to
update the force situation and front line trace. Weapon
system strengths and front line trace are plotted on graphs
similar to Figure 15 and Figure 16. The intelligence
section may use similar techniques to identify trends in
enemy force concentrations to compare with the expected
enemy course of action. These representations provide a
quantitative description of the brigade which is a
supplement to the brigade commander's qualitative analysis.
Similar tracking is executed for each support subsystem of
the force. The graphical representations enable visual
interpretation of trends. Future force conditions might be
predicted with some confidence based on continuation of
current tactical operations. Figure 22 shows a linear
regression application to the first two hours of data from
the simulated brigade delay. This predicted result compares
favorably with the actual outcome achieved for the
subsequent four hours of the delay. These trends may
provide the brigade staff with a technique to perform
tradeoff analysis; to tune priorities of support or




The brigade staff reviews the currently defined
desired state to determine if it is still valid. The
desired state may have changed due to a change in force
1 18

organization or as a result of a change in command guidance.
Initially, the commander and staff might seek to achieve
stability by executing the plan and holding the desired
state constant until trends are identified. This is in
contrast to "rapid cycle decisioning" which has been
suggested in some publications. [Ref. 24] The desired state
is graphically portrayed as a performance expectation
envelope. The width of the envelope creates thresholds of
sensitivity for identification of discrepancies.
3 . Compare Current Versus Desired State
The actual conditions are plotted and compared with
the defined desired state to identify discrepancies.
Subordinate unit conditions are aggregated to yield a
brigade description. The comparison might be performed by
visual inspection but could also be examined automatically
against preset thresholds. Exceptional conditions might be
reported to the operations officer as they are identified.
In Figure 19 such a discrepancy occurred for Task Force 1-12
at H+2 hours. This discrepancy was identified in the actual
execution of the delay. The succeeding tactics employed
sought to move the task force into the range of expectations
while maintaining the desired delay rate.
The comparison step may indicate that the current
plan is being executed effectively and no adjustments are
required. Unit performance levels which exceed the
commander's expectations may indicate an opportunity to
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seize the initiative. Unacceptable discrepancies may
suggest that immediate changes must be invoked to avert
disaster.
Changes are planned and executed in an abbreviated
decision cycle which may employ selected tools previously




A regression approach or a visual extrapolation of
trends using recent combat data will aid in the definition
of the time available to correct a discrepancy with
resources organic to the brigade. This analysis may result
in the determination that the only means to resolve the
discrepancy lie outside the brigade's resources. Initially,
the brigade staff seeks to generate alternatives within the
time constraint and available internal resources.
5 Generate Alternatives
In contrast to the initial planning sequence,
alternative generation in the control cycle involves
adjustment of current operating policies of support and
maneuver based on recent combat operations. The brigade
commander and operations officer seek to identify cause and
effect relationships. Each supporting subsystem may be
investigated to analyze its potential contribution to
correction of the discrepancy. Time is the critical
constraint on alternative generation and analysis in the
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control cycle. Delayed or inadequate responses may
accelerate the need for major changes to the current plan.
The delay simulation executed by the authors using
First Battle did not facilitate effects analysis for
specific corrective actions. Some corrective actions which
might be applied to reduce losses while achieving the
desired delay rate are a change in tactics of maneuver
forces, a change in allocation of engineer resources to
countermobil ity operations, or a change in allocation of
fire support resources. Perhaps the key concept suggested
here is to examine adjustment possibilities within the
support subsystems before invoking a change in the scheme of
maneuver. This approach results in a sequence of corrective
action execution, evaluation of results and subsequent
adjustment within the control cycle.
The analytic tools described in this section may
provide an improved measure of force performance during
mission execution. They facilitate identification of
unacceptable discrepancies and assist the staff to identify
trends in a combat environment. They are recommended as a
quantitative supplement to the qualitative evaluation




This thesis has developed and examined a model of the
force command control process for a U.S. Army Maneuver
Brigade executing a delay mission. The model was exercised
and revised by execution of a simulated delay using the
First Battle Combat Simulation. The theory employed to
develop the model emphasized the necessity of a systems
approach to the problem of force synchronization.
Potentially useful analytic tools were developed for
application during specific steps of the command control
process. These tools are designed to assist the force
commander and his staff as they execute planning and control
tasks during combat operations. The key concept which these
tools focus on is the projection, measurements and
comparison of force levels over time. This thesis has been
necessarily restricted to trend analysis within the maneuver
force for a specific tactical mission. An area of potential
examination is the description and prediction of other
technical subsystems' capability and actual performance in
support of the maneuver force.
These tools have limited feasibility in a manual command
control system but may have a higher likelihood of
widespread use with the advent of automated components in
the force command control system. While this study has
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focused on the maneuver brigade level of the force, the
tools may have greater potential for application at higher
levels of the force.
This thesis suggests that a component of the automated
command control systems might include parametric models to
enable relative comparison of alternative courses of action
over time, terrain and levels of combat. These parametric
predictions may enhance the commander's subjective analysis
of alternatives.
This study has provided an approach to the development
of specific analytic tools in the tactical command control
process. Subsequent studies might address applications for
other echelons of the force, applications for other tactical
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